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Abstract Extant contextualist theories have relied on the mechanism of pragmati-
cally driven modulation to explain the way non-indexical expressions take on different
interpretations in different contexts. In this paper I argue that a modulation-based con-
textualist semantics is untenable with respect to non-ambiguous expressions whose
invariant meaning fails to determine a unique literal interpretation, such as ‘lawyer’
‘musician’ ‘book’ and ‘game’. The invariant meaning of such an expression corre-
sponds to a range of closely related and equally basic interpretations, none of which
can be distinguished as the literal interpretation. Moreover, what counts as a literal
interpretation as opposed to a non-literal one is arguably vague. The nonuniqueness
of the literal interpretation and the vagueness in the literal/non-literal divide doubly
challenge a modulation-based semantics, for modulation is supposed to operate on
a unique literal interpretation to generate a clearly non-literal interpretation. Lastly
I contend that non-ambiguous expressions which lack determinate literal interpre-
tation are amenable to a Radical Contextualist semantics, according to which the
invariant meaning of such an expression directs its interpretation to congruent back-
ground information in context. Thereby, these expressions exhibit semantically driven
context sensitivity without displaying indexicality.




1 Department of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages,




According toRecanati (2004, 2010), contextualism is the tenet that “in general (i.e. not
only in the special case of indexicals1), the propositional contribution of an expression
is not fully determined by the invariant meaning conventionally associated with the
expression type but depends upon the context” (2010: 17). In the logical space of con-
textualism, there are two ways to understand the relationship between the invariant
meaning of a non-indexical expression and its propositional contribution in a con-
text. According to what I call ‘Moderate Contextualism’, which has been extensively
developed (Recanati 2004, 2010; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Carston 2002, etc.) and
criticised (Borg 2004, 2012; Cappelen and Lepore 2005, etc.) in the literature, the
invariant meaning of a non-indexical expression type corresponds to the literal inter-
pretation of its token in a context, whereas its propositional contribution is often a
pragmatically modulated interpretation of that token (Recanati 2010: 10). Accord-
ing to what I call ‘Radical Contextualism’, which is less explored in the literature
(Travis 2008; Recanati 2004: 140, 2010: 21; Carston 2012), the invariant meaning
of a non-indexical expression type is too unspecified and/or too rich to render a lit-
eral interpretation of its token in any context. Consequently, contextual adjustment is
required in every context to determine its propositional contribution.
At first glance, Moderate Contextualism appears to be more plausible than Radical
Contextualism for associating a literal interpretation with a non-indexical expression,
which is modulated into various intended interpretations in contexts. (Throughout this
paper I will use ‘intended interpretation’ and ‘propositional contribution’ interchange-
ably, ditto ‘interpretation’ and ‘content’). In the following well-known examples, it is
intuitively clear what the literal interpretation of the italic expression in (a) is. Roughly,
‘something’ literally means a thing that is unspecified or unknown; ‘raw’
means uncooked; ‘the ham sandwich’ literally denotes a contextually salient ham
sandwich.
(1) a. Something has happened (Carston 2002: 324).
b. Something noteworthy has happened.
(2) a. The steak is raw (Carston 2002: 328).
b. The steak is very undercooked.
(3) a. The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20 (Nunberg 1979: 149).
b. The customer who has ordered the ham sandwich is sitting at
table 20.
To get from the literal interpretation to a different yet contextually relevant interpreta-
tion such as that underlined in (b), what is involved is arguably not a matter of filling in
any contextual variable(s) encoded in the invariant meaning of the italic expression,2
1 The term ‘indexical’ here refers to expressions whose context sensitivity is encoded in their invariant
meaning and is closely related to their cognitive significance in terms of the speaker’s first-person access
to their referents (Kaplan 1989, see Sect. 4.2). The typical examples are ‘I’ ‘here’ and ‘now’.
2 Contra Moderate Contextualism, a number of authors have posited covert variables in the invari-
ant meaning of apparently non-indexical expressions to account for their context-sensitivity, espe-
cially for quantifier domain and colour adjectives, see Stanley (2000), Stanley and Szabó (2000),
123
Synthese
but that of adjusting its literal interpretation in accordance with the speaker’s commu-
nicative intentions (Recanati 2010: 182). The adjustment may consist in making the
literal interpretationmore specific, as in (1), making it looser, as in (2), or mapping it to
another interpretation on the basis of some contextually salient relation(s) between the
two, as in (3) (Carston 2002: 353; Recanati 2004: 24–26). After Recanati (1989: 304),
such pragmatically driven adjustment is generally known as modulation,3 whereas the
semantically driven filling-in of contextual variables is called saturation.
In contrast with Moderate Contextualism, Radical Contextualism rejects the idea
of there being a literal interpretation to be modulated in contexts. That is, the invariant
meaning of a non-indexical expression type is considered to be too abstract and/or
contain too much encyclopaedic information to determine a unique set of conditions
under which the expression is used literally, which would serve as its literal inter-
pretation (Recanati 2004: 140; Carston 2012: 607). Instead, the invariant meaning is
taken to interact directly with contextual information to determine interpretations in
contexts.
While authors in the contextualist camp have touched upon Radical Contextualism
(Recanati 2012; Carston 2012), the consensus seems to be that the context sensitivity
exhibited by non-indexical expressions is suitably handled by Moderate Contextual-
ism, leaving Radical Contextualism an underexplored possibility (but see Travis 2008;
Rayo 2013; Jaszczolt 2014). My aim in this paper is to argue that Moderate Contex-
tualism fails to handle cases wherein short of stipulation, there is no principled way
to determine the literal interpretation assumed by a non-indexical expression in every
context, which would serve as the input for pragmatic modulation. Such cases also
show that the distinction between a literal interpretation and a non-literal interpreta-
tion is vague. Therefore, they motivate a form of Radical Contextualism that extends
semantically driven context sensitivity beyond indexicality, or so I will argue.
The structure of the paper goes as follows. Section 2 presents some generalizable
cases wherein the literal interpretation of an expression is indeterminate. Section 3
further illustrates that the distinction between literal interpretations and non-literal
interpretations is vague, and explores the implications of the indeterminacy and
vagueness of literal interpretation for the debate on the semantics/pragmatics inter-
face. Section 4 contends that expressions which lack determinate literal interpretation
exhibit semantically driven context sensitivity without displaying indexicality. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
Footnote 2 continued
Szabó (2001), Rothschild and Segal (2009), Hansen (2011) and Vicente (2012). I propose a form of Radical
Contextualism that recognises a third possibility between saturation and modulation in Sect. 4.
3 While ‘modulation’ is sometimes used narrowly to denote contextual adjustment of the literal interpreta-
tion, and the term ‘unarticulated constituent’ is used to denote contextual enrichment which introduces new
material into the logical form, here I follow Borg’s (2012) suggestion that unarticulated constituents could
be subsumed under cases of modulation, because enrichment can be regarded as making more specific the
literal interpretation, which is a kind of modulation.
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2 Indeterminacy of literal interpretation
In this section I present cases in which the literal interpretation of a non-indexical, non-
ambiguous expression is indeterminate. The argument strategy is as follows. Firstly,
I construct examples to show that the intended interpretations of a non-indexical, non-
ambiguous expression in various contexts are equally literal. Thus, in principle any one
of these interpretations can be taken as the literal interpretation, while the rest would
be generated by modulation. In other words, there is no backward route from these
interpretations and the mechanism of modulation to the literal interpretation which
is supposed to be the input for modulation. Secondly, in order to determine which
interpretation is the literal one, I examine the invariant meaning of the expression
by reference to its lexical entry in a standard dictionary. Here I make the reasonable
assumption that lexical entries in reputable dictionaries are formulated on the basis
of careful empirical examination of the prevailing linguistic conventions associated
with an expression, and hence provide reliable data for its conventional, context-
independent, invariant meaning.4 Thereby I observe that the invariant meaning fails
to single out a literal interpretation. Crucially, without an independently motivated
method to determine the literal interpretation, modulation cannot get off the ground.
Granted, one can stipulate what the literal interpretation is and define modulation as
the mechanism that takes us from it to the intended interpretations, but such stipulation
provides no justification for modulation.
Here come the examples. Consider theword ‘lawyer’. An individualmay be called a
lawyer at various stages of her professional development in the legal field. To start with,
suppose 5 years ago Emma was a student at Murray Edwards College, Cambridge,
reading a bachelor’s degree in Law. As students in a college are studying in different
departments, it is common practice among tutorial officers in the college to refer to
them by the occupational terms typically associated with their departments. Hence,
a student in Law is called a lawyer, a student in Physics a physicist, a student in
Chemistry a chemist, and so on. The occupational terms used in this kind of language
game are not intended to be ironic, hyperbolic, or figurative, but merely an efficient
way to categorise students by their departments.5 Thus, 5 years ago an utterance of
(4a) by a tutorial officer to convey Emma’s status would express the proposition in
(4b).
(4) a. Emma is a lawyer.
4 To theoretically assess the context sensitivity of an expression, one needs empirical data regarding its
context-independent meaning and its intended interpretation at a context. However, while one plausibly has
reliable intuition on the intended interpretation (Recanati 1989), one’s intuition on the context-independent
meaning can be tenuous. My solution here is to appeal to reputable dictionaries to have some grasp of
the conventional meaning in order to set off the theoretical assessment. To the best of my knowledge,
this is not an uncommon strategy in the theoretical discussion on the semantics/pragmatics interface. It is
advantageous over the (also common) strategy of using a theorist’s own intuition to state what an expression
literally means independently of context.
5 In a similar vein, I have heard lecturers in Law calling themselves ‘lawyers’ ‘commercial lawyers’
‘criminal lawyers’, etc. in order to convey their research interests. Again such uses are hardly figurative, as




b. Emma is a student in Law.
c. Emma is learned in Law.
d. Emma is a legal practitioner.
e. Emma is a qualified barrister.
Over the period of 5 years, Emmawas increasingly learned in law and engaged in prac-
ticing law, firstly giving sound legal advice to family and friends, then drafting legal
documents as an intern in a law firm, and finally representing clients in legal negotia-
tions and court proceedings. At different stages of her career path, several utterances of
(4a) can be truthfully made, with the word ‘lawyer’ associated with different intended
interpretations, as in (4c)–(4e). For example, after frequently receiving her sound
legal advice, Emma’s father asserts (4a), expressing approximately the proposition in
(4c). Upon watching Emma’s strong abilities in drafting legal documents and advising
clients, her boss introduces her by saying (4a), expressing roughly the proposition in
(4d). After Emma receives her qualifications, her mother utters (4a), expressing the
proposition in (4e).
It seems that the use of ‘lawyer’ to describe a student who has just started her BA
in Law involves a modulated interpretation. If so, what is the literal interpretation of
‘lawyer’ that is being modulated? A common way to decide whether a given inter-
pretation is the literal one is to see if it corresponds to a literal use, for a literal use
reflects (null modulation on) the literal interpretation whereas a deviant use involves
modulation on the literal interpretation. With respect to (4b), it is clear that ‘lawyer’
is used in a deviant way, which indicates that its interpretation in (4b) is not identical
to the literal interpretation. However, apropos (4c)–(4e), it is not obvious that the uses
of ‘lawyer’ are deviant, or the one of them is more literal than the others. While the
intended interpretations of ‘lawyer’ in (4c)–(4e) differ in how strictly they impose on
its application criterion, the strictest one need not be the literal one. If the uses of
‘lawyer’ in (4c)–(4e) are equally literal, it follows that the interpretations of ‘lawyer’
in (4c)–(4e) are equally identical to the literal interpretation. Thus, any one of them
can be taken as the literal interpretation, while the rest would be generated by modula-
tion in the form of appropriate specification or loosening. If so, from certain intended
interpretation and modulation, there seems to be no way to work out backwards what
the literal interpretation is.
To determine the literal interpretation independently, one may turn to the definition
of ‘lawyer’ in a trusted dictionary. For instance, according to Black’s Law Dictionary,
‘lawyer’ means “a person learned in the law; as an attorney, counsel
or solicitor; a person who is practicing law” (1979: 799). Assuming that
the dictionary definition captures the conventional, context-independent understanding
of ‘lawyer’, it does not spell out a particular literal interpretation, for it merely lists
three related senses: (a) a person learned in the law, (b) a person who is
practicing law, and (c) an attorney, counsel or solicitor.
Since the senses are closely related, with (c) normally implying (b), which in turn
usually implies (a), they do not correspond to three distinct literal interpretations of
‘lawyer’. That ‘lawyer’ is not three-way ambiguous is supported by the fact that in (5),
‘three lawyers’ could refer to a newly graduated student in Law, an intern practising
law, and a qualified working solicitor. To compare, the fact that in (6) ‘two banks’
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cannot refer to a financial bank and a river bank (unless it is intended as zeugma)
suggests that ‘bank’ is two-way ambiguous.
(5) There are three lawyers in the family.
(6) There are two banks around the corner.
To determine the literal interpretation among the related senses, one may ask (i)
whether one of them is more basic or central than the others, or (ii) whether they
are underlain by a more abstract interpretation. An answer to (i) typically relies on
intuitions. For example, given a natural-kind term, intuitions appear to privilege a
chemistry textbook style definition as its basic meaning. Thus the interpretation of
‘water’ in terms of the substance’s chemical makeup and physical properties appears
to be basic whereas other related interpretations (e.g. a watery fluid formed or
circulating in a living body) strike our intuitions as derivative. Similarly, if an
expression harbours related but more or less metaphorical senses, intuition-wise the
metaphor-free sense is more likely to be taken as basic. Hence in the case of ‘raw’,
the sense of not cooked strikes us as more basic than the metaphor-prone sense
of in a natural state: not treated or prepared. A discussion on why our
meta-semantic intuitions bias towards naturalist and/or non-metaphorical construals of
basic interpretation will take us afar, but taking these intuitions at face value, it suffices
to note that for ‘lawyer’, a parallel intuition is not forthcoming. Is learnedness in law
more central to the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ than the fact that one is practising law, or
that one is qualified to do so? It depends on the context, especially on the background
information about the interlocutors’ interests (see Sect. 4.1). If the interest lies in
hiring a legal representative for a lawsuit, ‘lawyer’ will naturally be interpreted as
a qualified barrister. If the interest is in seeking legal advice, what matters is
whether the person is learned in law. Should the interest be counting family members
with legal expertise, the interpretation would probably encompass all three senses.
Such context dependency suggests that none of the senses commonly associated with
‘lawyer’ stands out as more basic or central than the others. Accordingly, they are
equally good candidates for being the literal interpretation of ‘lawyer’.
Secondly, is there a more abstract sense of ‘lawyer’ which underlies the senses
listed in its lexical entry? To compare, while ‘cut’ may be said to harbour related senses
corresponding to different ways of cutting such as making an opening, an incision, or
a wound, it is possible to abstract over such difference and identify a more abstract
interpretation for ‘cut’, roughly “effect a linear separation affecting the
integrity of (some object) by means of an edged instrument” (Recanati
2010: 40).6 However, the same strategy of abstraction does not work for ‘lawyer’, for
the related senses are complementary to each other in such a way that it is implausible
to abstract over the differences among them. That is, a qualified barrister or solicitor is
usually, but not necessarily, a person practicing law, and vice versa; a person practicing
law is typically, but not necessarily, learned in law, and vice versa. In this respect,
6 Carston (2002: 361) remarks that even if one can associate an abstract sense with a verb like ‘open’ by
abstracting away the differences among the more specific senses of ‘open’ in, say, ‘open the mouth’ ‘open
the window’ ‘open the can’ and ‘open the discussion’, the abstraction seems to result in a sense that is too
non-representational to be grasped.
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they are unlike the senses commonly associated with ‘cut’, which represent diverging
ways of making specific an underlying basic interpretation. The common denominator
among the senses associated with ‘lawyer’, roughly a person related to Law
in some way, is too weak to serve as its basic interpretation, for it fails to account
for the intuition that the use of ‘lawyer’ for a student in Law is deviant. Moreover, if
one pursues a suitably abstract interpretation of ‘lawyer’ that encompasses only the
related senses, one may end up with an inherently context-sensitive one, such as a
person who has completed a certain required training in the Law.7 As
the required level and type of legal training implied by a use of ‘lawyer’ varies from
context to context, the abstract interpretation seems to turn ‘lawyer’ into an inherently
context-sensitive expression, on a par with an indexical. That is, it implies that when
‘lawyer’ is used, context is always invoked to fix a certain level and type of legal
training pertinent to the present use. Provided that “modulation takes place in some
contexts and not others, while saturation, being linguistically mandated in virtue of
lexical properties of the expression type, is bound to take place in all felicitous uses
of the expression” (Recanati 2010: 57–58), an inherently context-sensitive sense of
‘lawyer’ calls for saturation, rather than modulation, for resolving at least some of its
context sensitivity. Furthermore, the saturated information pertaining to the required
level and type of legal training may be all that is required to map ‘lawyer’ onto a
contextually relevant interpretation, leaving modulation superfluous.8 For instance, in
the case of ‘lawyer’ meaning a student who has just started herBA in Law,
the required level and type of legal training may be set to a suitable minimum.
More generally, while it is logically possible, as one reviewer suggested, that the
contextual interpretation of a non-indexical expression is arrived at through both sat-
uration of an abstract, context-sensitive meaning to derive a literal interpretation and
modulation of the literal interpretation thus derived, in practice, such a dual picture is
difficult to maintain. By Occam’s razor, why not simply say that the relevant interpre-
tation is derived by saturation alone, with the contextual variable suitably construed
to reflect the required context sensitivity (see footnote 2)? Moreover, how does one
decide what counts as saturation and what as modulation? For example, a relative
adjective such as ‘wide’ has context-sensitive interpretations, depending on the type
of entities it is used to modify. Thus, what counts as a wide wound differs dramatically
from what counts as a wide chair, which in turn differs significantly from what counts
as a wide canal. Of course, the context sensitivity does not end here. What count as
wide seating space, wide sleeping space and wide dining space likewise differ. By the
same token, ‘wide’ takes on different interpretations when its application in a con-
text concerns seating space for young children, seating space for teenagers or seating
space for adults (cf. Cappelen and Lepore 2005, Chapter 5). Now if ‘wide’ harbours
a contextual variable in its inherent meaning for saturation, which in turn renders a
literal interpretation for modulation, at what level of granularity should the contex-
7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretation.
8 In Sect. 4 I show that we do not need to posit a covert variable in the meaning of ‘lawyer’ to handle its
context sensitivity, by recognising a third possibility between saturation and modulation. The reason for
resisting a saturation-based analysis is that it is implausible to justify a covert variable on the basis of certain
abstract interpretation of ‘lawyer’ proposed ad hoc to encompass its related senses.
123
Synthese
tual variable be construed? Does it denote a broadly construed entity type, leaving
the further specification of its interpretation to modulation, or does it denote a more
finely grained type, viz. a type of activity-relative entities? Why not cut the variable
even more finely, to do with a type of entities that are individual- and activity-relative?
The more finely grained the variable is construed, the more of the context-sensitivity
would be handled by saturation, and the less of it by modulation. My aim here is
not to delve into the complex issues surrounding the context sensitivity of relative
adjectives (see Recanati 2010, Chapter 2 for discussion), but to illustrate that if one
associates a context-sensitive meaning with a non-indexical expression, one may open
the floodgates to pervasive saturation and thus undermine modulation.
Returning to ‘lawyer’, without a suitably abstract, context-insensitive interpreta-
tion that would encompass (only) the senses listed in its entry, these senses seem to
jointly constitute the invariant meaning of ‘lawyer’. It then follows that the invariant
meaning does not determine a unique literal interpretation for ‘lawyer’ as the input
for modulation.
Cases in which the invariant meaning of a non-ambiguous expression consists of
several closely related, equally literal interpretations are common among occupational
terms, to witness also ‘musician’ (a person who plays a musical instrument,
especially (although not necessarily) as a profession, or is musically
talented), ‘chemist’ (an expert in chemistry or a person engaged in
chemical research or experiments) and ‘analyst’ (a person who analyzes
or who is skilled in analysis). They can also be found in adjectives such as
‘silky’ (made of silk or of material that is soft, smooth, and shiny
like silk) and ‘homemade’ (made in the home, on the premises, or by
one’s own efforts).9 They constitute a category of expressions that lack a unique
literal interpretation.
To illustrate the indeterminacy of literal interpretation with a different set of exam-
ples, consider what Nunberg (1979) called “pragmatically polysemous” expressions
such as ‘book’ and ‘game’. As Nunberg remarked,
[T]here are many cases of multiple use for which we can’t have clear intuitions
that one or another use is prior. Take the use of game to refer to activities or sets
of rules; of window to refer to holes or the things that go in them; of book to
refer to inscriptions or contents; of gossip to refer to a kind of activity or a kind
of information; of captain to refer to a rank or to the people who hold that rank.
(1979: 166)
These expressions are pragmatically polysemous in that while they are associated with
different equally literal interpretations and in this respect count as polysemous, the
difference among the interpretations does not amount to lexical semantic ambiguity
(Nunberg 1979: 150). Firstly, dual interpretations are often possible within one occur-
rence of the expression without inducing any zeugmatic effects. For example ‘book’
in (7) is interpreted both as a physical object which is thick and a body of content
which carries information.
9 The lexical meanings of ‘musician’ and ‘chemist’ are taken from Wikipedia whereas those of ‘analyst’
‘silky’ and ‘homemade’ are from the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary.
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(7) The first chapter of this thick book is about the countryside.
Moreover, dual interpretations can be distributed over an occurrence of the expression
and a pronoun anaphorically linked to it. In (8) ‘chess’ is interpreted as game activity
whereas the anaphoric ‘it’ is interpreted as the rule of the game.
(8) I have played chess a couple of times and I am slowly getting the hang of it.
The availability of dual (or multiple) interpretations shows that the expression is not
two-way (or multiple-way) ambiguous.
Importantly for the present purpose, a pragmatically polysemous expression lacks
a unique literal interpretation. In principle, any one of the interpretations commonly
associated with it can be taken as the literal interpretation, while the rest would be
generated by modulation in the form of property transfer based on some common,
salient, or intended relations between the taken literal interpretation and the others.
For instance, one could take the literal interpretation of ‘book’ to be a written or
printed work consisting of pages glued or sewn together along one
side and bound in covers,10 and derive its interpretation in terms of a literary
composition contained in a written or printed work by modulation in
virtue of the containment relation between a physical work and its content. Yet in
equal measure, one could take the content-based interpretation as the literal one and
derive the object-based interpretation by modulation in view of the same containment
relation.
Note that the more concrete interpretation need not be the basic one. For one thing,
it is contentious whether one is disposed to think of an abstract entity in terms of a
(more) concrete one (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For another, even if the object-
based interpretation is the basic interpretation of ‘book’, for many other pragmatically
polysemous expressions, the interpretations commonly associated with them are about
similarly concrete objects (e.g. window frame versus window glass for ‘window’) or
similarly abstract entities (e.g. activities vs. rules for ‘game’). Insofar as the interpre-
tations are equally literal and intuitively basic to the same extent, there is no way of
deciding which one is the literal interpretation. If the interpretations commonly asso-
ciated with a pragmatically polysemous expression constitute its invariant meaning in
equal measure, its meaning does not determine a unique literal interpretation.
To sum up, in this section I have contended that in some cases, the invariant mean-
ing of a non-indexical, non-ambiguous expression fails to determine a unique literal
interpretation. As the invariant meaning corresponds to a range of closely related and
equally literal interpretations, it is indeterminate which one of them is the literal inter-
pretation. Any one of them can be taken as the literal interpretation, while the rest
would be generated by modulation in the form of (i) specification or loosening when
the interpretations are more or less strict, as in the case of ‘lawyer’, or (ii) property
transfer when the interpretations pick out different aspects of an entity, as in the case
of ‘book’. If there is no way to adjudicate among equally literal interpretations, then to
mimic Russell, there is no backward road from them and the mechanism of modulation
to the literal interpretation.
10 The interpretations of ‘book’ in this paragraph are taken from the Oxford Dictionary of English.
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Crucially, the indeterminate nature of literal interpretation renders modulation—
arguably the centrepiece ofModerate Contextualism—ill-justified.When the invariant
meaning of a non-ambiguous expression encodes a range of related interpretations,
none of which appears to be more basic than the others, it is implausible to speak
of the literal interpretation that the expression assumes in every context, on which
modulation operates to deliver various interpretations in contexts. In other words, if
the notion of a unique literal interpretation is independently suspicious, there would
be no independently motivated basis for modulation. Granted, one can stipulate that
a certain interpretation is the literal one and define modulation as the mechanism that
generates other interpretations from the stipulated literal one. However, insofar as
modulation is construed as a robust hypothesis of the way expressions are interpreted
in contexts, it turns out to be non-operant in cases where the invariant meaning fails
to determine a unique literal interpretation in the first place. On this score, these cases
go against Moderate Contextualism.
In the next section I address some possible replies to the above argument and
argue that vagueness in the distinction between literal and non-literal interpretations
impugnsModerate Contextualism and undermines the debate between it and Semantic
Minimalism.
3 Vagueness in the literal/non-literal divide
To start with, friends of modulation may reply that the above examples present only a
mild challenge for modulation. On a more charitable reading of Moderate Contextu-
alism, modulation operates on some literal interpretation determined by the invariant
meaning of a non-indexical, non-ambiguous expression. If ‘some’ is read as an exis-
tential quantifier, modulation is compatible with there being more than one literal
interpretation associated with the expression. Thus construed, intended interpretations
in contextswould be generated by twomechanisms.On the one hand,modulation oper-
ates on a literal interpretation (it doesn’tmatter which one it is if there ismore than one)
to generate an intended non-literal interpretation. On the other hand, if the intended
interpretation is a literal one, it would result from pragmatically driven selection over
the related senses commonly associated with the expression.
For this line of reply to go through, it requires an independently justified method
of deciding when an intended interpretation counts as literal. However, just as inter-
pretations can be equally literal, as argued in Sect. 2, they can be more or less literal,
which precludes a clear-cut distinction between literal and non-literal interpretations.
For example, while the use of ‘lawyer’ to describe a person learned in law involves
a literal interpretation, and its use to describe a student who has just started her BA in
Law demands a non-literal interpretation, it is easy to imagine a series of individuals
who are more or less learned in law and to whom ‘lawyer’ can be applied in suitably
different contexts. Given such a series of contexts, it is unclear in which contexts the
interpretations of ‘lawyer’ count as literal and in which contexts the interpretations
count as non-literal. Intuitively, the more learned in law an individual is, the more
literal the use of ‘lawyer’ in the context would be. If so, it would be implausible to
draw a clear-cut distinction between literal and non-literal interpretations of ‘lawyer’.
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Or consider ‘musician’. On the one hand, ‘musician’ can be applied, with a non-
literal interpretation, to a child who has started her piano lessons, in such a context
that the child is the only one in the house who can play some music and her parents
call her “our in-house musician”. On the other hand, the application of ‘musician’ to
a professional pianist involves a literal interpretation. In-between these two extremes,
one can envisage a series of individuals who are more or less competent in playing the
piano and to whom ‘musician’ can be applied in suitably different contexts. Thereby, it
is unclear at which point the use of ‘musician’ ceases to be associatedwith a non-literal
interpretation and takes on a literal one.
Note that vagueness in what counts as a literal (or non-literal) interpretation is
a kind of meta-linguistic vagueness orthogonal to linguistic vagueness standardly
observed with expressions such as ‘bald’ or ‘heap’. Linguistic vagueness concerns the
applicability of an expression relative to a particular interpretation, whereas themeta-
linguistic vagueness concerns the literalness of a contextually plausible interpretation
of the expression, irrespective of whether the applicability of the expression under this
interpretation is vague or precise.
For example, relative to the interpretation of (i) having a scalp wholly or
partly lacking hair, the applicability of ‘bald’ exhibits linguistic vagueness, as
there is no obvious boundary between the application and the non-application of ‘bald’
under this interpretation. Nonetheless, in addition to (i), ‘bald’ has a second common
interpretation, namely (ii) not having any extra detail or explanation, as
in ‘The bald statement in the preceding paragraph requires amplification’.11 A use of
‘bald’ under (i), linguistically vague as it is, seems clearly literal, whereas a use of
‘bald’ under (ii), linguistically vague or not, appears to be non-literal. In other words,
the two interpretations of ‘bald’ do not exhibit meta-linguistic vagueness, while under
at least one of them, the applicability of ‘bald’ manifests linguistic vagueness.
To compare, the contextually plausible interpretations of ‘lawyer’ manifest meta-
linguistic vagueness, in that it is unclear which ones of them count as literal and which
are non-literal. For instance, the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ in terms of (a) a person
who is practicing Law is clearly literal whereas its interpretation in terms of (b) a
person who is studying Law is clearly non-literal, albeit plausible in a suitable
context. How about the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ in terms of (c) a legal intern
with a degree in Law? While one can easily imagine a context in which a use
of ‘lawyer’ under (c) is felicitous, is such a use literal or non-literal? A person who
satisfies (c) is likely to be learned in law, yet precisely because of the likelihood, the
literalness of (c) is not a clear-cut matter. More generally, we lack sharp intuition or a
crisp theoretical criterion for deciding which contextually relevant interpretations are
literal and which are not. However, such meta-linguistic vagueness is independent of
linguistic vagueness. The applicability of ‘lawyer’ under (a), (b) or (c) is quite precise.
A person either is, or is not, practising Law. Thereby, the applicability of ‘lawyer’
under (a) is relatively crisp. Mutatis mutandis for (b) and (c). Crucially, such crispness
does not bear on the literalness of the interpretation. Conversely, an interpretation of
‘lawyer’ in terms of (d) a person learned in Law renders a vague application
11 The two senses of ‘bald’ and the example are taken from the Oxford English Dictionary.
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criterion, for there is no clear division between individuals who are learned in law and
those who are not. Yet such linguistic vagueness in the applicability of ‘lawyer’ under
(d) does not impinge on the literalness of (d).
It could be that virtually all expressions aremeta-linguistically vague, with interpre-
tations that are neither clearly literal nor clearly non-literal, and linguistically vague,
with imprecise application criteria under this or that interpretation. Be that as it may,
insofar as the two kinds of vagueness are independent, our immediate concern is the
metalinguistic vagueness in the literalness of certain interpretations of an expression,
rather than the linguistic vagueness in the applicability of an expression under a par-
ticular interpretation. The metalinguistic vagueness is well-observed in the literature.
For instance, Carston (2002: 333) remarks that the difference among strictly literal
uses, loose uses and metaphorical uses is a matter of degree. For example, consider
the more or less metaphorical uses of ‘door’ in (9a)–(9c):
(9) a. Harrods opens the door at 10 a.m. Monday–Saturday.
b. Harrods opens the door to shoppers eager for luxurious designer footwear
with the addition of a new Shoe Salon.
c. Harrods opens the door to criticism for selling real animal fur.
The interpretation of ‘door’ in (9a) is literalwhereas that in (9c) is non-literal. However,
with respect to (9b), the interpretation appears to be partly literal and partly non-literal,
which makes it a borderline case for the literal/non-literal divide.
Or consider the uses of ‘religiously’ in (10a)–(10c):
(10) a. James follows Buddhism religiously.
b. James follows a Zen lifestyle religiously.
c. James follows the Atkins diet religiously.
As the uses of ‘religiously’ represent lesser or greater departure from its central mean-
ing (believing in a god or a group of gods and following the rules of
a religion), they involve more or less literal interpretations. Crucially, the existence
of intermediate cases such as (10b) makes it impossible to draw a clear-cut distinction
between literal and non-literal interpretations.
Without a clear-cut distinction between literal interpretations and non-literal ones,
one cannot save modulation by saying that modulation outputs an intended non-literal
interpretation whereas selection over related senses outputs an intended literal inter-
pretation. Given what we have exemplified so far, not only is it indeterminate what the
literal interpretation is that serves as the input for modulation, but it is also indeter-
minate what counts as a non-literal interpretation that is supposed to be the output of
modulation. For modulation to do serious explanatory work, its explanandum has to
be robust, which consists of (i) there being an independently identifiable literal inter-
pretation and (ii) there being a clear-cut distinction between the literal interpretation
and other intended interpretations. In typical examples cited by friends of modula-
tion, such as (1)–(3), the explanandum is robust, hence the viability of modulation.
However, in the examples discussed above, what with the indeterminate nature of the
literal interpretation, and what with the vagueness in the literal/non-literal divide, the
explanandum is arguably tenuous, hence the untenability of modulation.
The above arguments against modulation not only impugn Moderate Contextual-
ism, but also undermine Semantic Minimalism. Thereby, the cases discussed above
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shall best be handled in a Radical Contextualist framework within which semantically
driven context sensitivity is extended beyond the small set of indexicals discussed in
Demonstratives (Kaplan 1989) (cf. footnote 2), with the proviso that indexicality is a
special case of semantically driven context sensitivity which does extra explanatory
work for the “ego-orientation” (Kaplan 1989: 531) of indexical thoughts (i.e. thoughts
whose expression requires the use of standard indexicals).12
To start with, one of the central issues that divide Moderate Contextualism and
Semantic Minimalism is whether modulation is relevant to semantic content, given
certain desiderata of what semantic content is for. According to SemanticMinimalism,
the semantic content of a sentence (relative to a context) corresponds to a minimal
proposition (Borg 2004, 2012; Cappelen and Lepore 2005) or sub-proposition (Bach
1994), which is derived on the basis of lexical meaning and syntactic structure. As
semantic content is supposed to reflect the systematicity and stability of semantic
understanding, it shall be immune to the pervasive contextual fluctuation brought by
pragmatically driven modulation.
More often than not, the minimal proposition or sub-proposition is construed in
terms of the literal interpretation of the sentence, which is composed out of the literal
interpretations of its constituents. Thereby, theminimal proposition or sub-proposition
is taken to be what competent speakers can (and would) fall back on when the sentence
is taken out of context (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 185), or when the relevant con-
textual information that affects the literal interpretation is abstracted away (Soames
2002: 109).13
Now if the notion of literal interpretation is both indeterminate and vague, it will
be both indeterminate what the minimal proposition or sub-proposition is, for there
may be equally good candidates for being the literal interpretation of its constituent,
and vague whether a sentential content counts as the minimal proposition or sub-
proposition, for it is unclear whether an interpretation of its constituent counts as
literal or non-literal. Consequently, in some cases there would be no clear, determi-
nate minimal proposition or sub-proposition that competent speakers could fall back
on. Furthermore, if the invariant meaning of an expression fails to determine a unique
literal interpretation in the first place, no propositional content would remain when
12 I have brushed off Semantic Relativism (MacFarlane 2005; Lasersohn 2005; Stephenson 2007, etc.) as
a possible avenue to account for the lexical context-sensitivity discussed in this paper, for the cases that
motivate SemanticRelativism seem to be the exact opposite of the cases thatmotivateRadical Contextualism
(but see Predelli’s 2005 relativist treatment of Travis’s 1997 ‘green leaf’ case). The former cases typically
involve expressions such as taste predicates and knowledge predicates whose uses can generate so-called
faultless disagreements. While the status of a faultless disagreement is highly debatable (see Cohnitz
and Marques 2014 for a recent overview), for those who view it as a substantial (i.e. not merely verbal)
disagreement that involves a clash of doxastic attitudes, the disagreement would concern a sentential content
that is held constant among the disagreeing parties. According to this view, the invariant meaning of the
critical expression involved, such as ‘know’ or ‘tasty’, determines a constant interpretation. In this respect,
they are the antitheses of the expressions discussed above, whose invariant meaning seems unable to
determine a constant literal interpretation.
13 Proponents of Moderate Contextualism have long argued that a minimal proposition or sub-proposition
seldom tracks pre-theoretical truth-conditional judgements (Recanati 2004) and plays no prominent role




contextual adjustment is abstracted away. Thus construed, indeterminacy and vague-
ness in the literal interpretation challenge Semantic Minimalism. In fact, if there is
no clear-cut distinction between literal interpretation and modulated interpretation,
it would be spurious to debate whether the one or the other should figure in seman-
tic content. In this respect, the argument against modulation undermines the debate
between Semantic Minimalism and Moderate Contextualism.
4 Between modulation and saturation: semantically driven context
sensitivity without indexicality
In this section I argue that the context sensitivity exhibited by expressions that lack
determinate literal interpretation instantiates a third possibility between modulation
and saturation. That is, instead of fixing a determinate literal interpretation, the invari-
ant meaning of an expression such as ‘lawyer’ seems to direct its interpretation to
congruent background information in a context, so that the invariant meaning and the
background information jointly (and often sufficiently) determine its interpretation.
In Sect. 4.1 I submit that the context sensitivity in question is primarily semantically
driven, hence resisting a modulation-based analysis. In Sect. 4.2 I contend that the
context sensitivity does not amount to saturation, for saturation involves an egocentric
conception of the contextual variables (to be saturated) that helps explain the cogni-
tive significance of standard indexicals. Thus construed, saturation is a special case of
semantically driven context sensitivity relevant to indexicals but not to ‘lawyer’ and
the ilk.
4.1 Semantically driven context sensitivity
To start with, context is understood as a situation that accompanies a speech act (cf.
Recanati 2010: 184), which is often, but not necessarily, identical to the situation in
which the speech act takes place (see e.g. Predelli’s 1998 improper contexts relative to
which recorded messages and post-it notes are interpreted). An expression is semanti-
cally context-sensitive if its invariant meaning directs its interpretation in a context to
congruent contextual information, i.e. information from the context that agrees with
information encoded in the meaning (more on this below). Semantically driven con-
text sensitivity gives rise to what King and Stanley (2005) called “weak pragmatic
effects”,
A weak pragmatic effect on what is communicated by an utterance is a case
in which context (including speaker intentions) determines interpretation of a
lexical item in accord with the standing meaning of that lexical item. A strong
effect on what is communicated is a contextual effect on what is communicated
that is notmerely pragmatic in theweak sense. (King andStanley 2005: 118–119,
my emphasis)
In other words, strong pragmatic effects arise when the invariant meaning of an expres-
sion does not constrain its interpretation in a context. Instead, the interpretation is
primarily determined by the speaker’s communicative intention. If the interpretation
123
Synthese
of an expression exhibits strong pragmatic effects, I call it “pragmatically context-
sensitive”.
When an expression is semantically context-sensitive, its invariant meaning plays a
central role in determining its interpretationbydirecting the interpretation to contextual
information that accords with the meaning. This does not mean that the speaker’s
intention plays no role at all in fixing the interpretation. Rather, speaker’s intention
can, and often does, play a subsidiary role in specifying the interpretation in accordance
with the invariant meaning. Take standard indexicals for example. While the meaning
of ‘now’ or ‘here’ (qua indexical) directs its interpretation to the temporal or locative
feature of a context, as various stretches of time or space can be identified as the time or
place of utterance, the interpretation of ‘now’ or ‘here’ is usually specified in relation
to the speaker’s intention. For example, when a visitor utters (11) in the garden of
Newnham College, Cambridge, she could mean that she has been in the garden, in
Newnham College, or in Cambridge before.
(11) I have been here before.
The interpretation of ‘here’ is specified in relation to her referential intention. Similarly,
when one is given permission to speak or write for someone else, as when one is asked
to pen a note for one’s mother to congratulate one’s niece but at the same time also
has a plan to write a congratulatory note oneself, the token of ‘I’ in (12) would invite
two possible interpretations.
(12) I am writing to congratulate you on your graduation from Bristol University.
Here the situation that accompanies the act of writing appears to contain two possible
authors, depending on whose hat the writing agent is putting on. In this and similar
cases, while the invariant meaning of the indexical directs its interpretation to a con-
textual feature, access to the speaker’s intention is required to identify that feature in
order to fix the interpretation.
In contrast, when an expression is pragmatically context-sensitive, the speaker’s
intention plays a central role in determining the interpretation, while the invariant
meaning plays at best a subsidiary role in facilitating the inference to the intended
interpretation. Take a standard case ofmodulation for example. In (1) (repeated below),
the invariant meaning of ‘something’, roughly a thing that is unspecified or
unknown, does not by itself direct its interpretation to anything in the context that is
noteworthy. Rather, it is the fact that ‘something’ is uttered, together with the Gricean
presumption that the speaker’s utterance is intended to be informative and relevant,
that leads to the interpretation of ‘something’ as a thing that is noteworthy in
accordance with the speaker’s communicative intention.
(1) a. Something has happened.
b. Something noteworthy has happened.
As far as context sensitivity is concerned, an expression devoid of determinate
literal interpretation seems to pattern with a standard indexical. Its invariant meaning
would direct its interpretation to background information in the context that fits with the
meaning. Background information is broadly understood as what has been established
so far that is available for interpreting the speech act (Stalnaker 1998: 5), in terms of
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the interlocutors’ interests, shared assumptions, etc. The background information that
concurs with the invariant meaning often determines the interpretation in a relatively
automatic manner. When it fails to fully fix the interpretation, access to the speaker’s
intention would be required to identify the interpretation.
By the invariant meaning of an expression, I mean the semantic information it
encodes, which reflects how it is normally used. For instance, the invariant meaning
of ‘lawyer’ seems to encode the information that it normally applies to (i) a person
learned in law, (ii) a person who is practising law, or (iii) an attorney, counsel or
solicitor.14 Importantly, while the lexical information comprises a constellation of
related senses, since the senses are closely related, it is not implausible to hypothesise
that the information is not mentally organised in terms of a simple list. In other words,
the organisation of the lexical information associatedwith a pragmatically polysemous
expression, such as ‘lawyer’ and ‘book’, is likely to differ from that of a semantically
ambiguous expression, such as ‘bank’. While the latter may be organised in a list-
like fashion, the former might well be organised more holistically, akin to what Rayo
(2013) describes as a “grab-bag model”.
With each expression of the basic lexicon, the subject associates a ‘grab bag’
of mental items: memories, mental images, pieces of encyclopedic information,
pieces of anecdotal information, mental maps, and so forth. …A grab-bag will
typically not be enough to determine a range of application for the relevant
lexical item independently of the subject’s general-purpose abilities. But, by
exercising sensitivity to context and common sense, the right kind of subject in
the right kind of context might be in a position to use the grab bag to come to a
sensible decision about what to treat as the expression’s range of application for
the purposes at hand. (Rayo 2013: 648)
For instance, the lexical information about the normal ranges of application of ‘lawyer’
in terms of (i), (ii) and (iii) might be organised as semantic memory, encyclopaedic
and anecdotal information about learnedness in law, holdings of relevant professional
qualifications, professional profiles, and even average salaries and lifestyles of lawyers
in one’s society. While this baggage of lexically encoded information can be conve-
niently spelt out, theoretically or lexicographically, as a list of related senses, it need
not be, and is probably not, mentally organised through listing those senses.
Thereby, the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ in a context may not be arrived at via selec-
tion from a list of related senses, for one may have no such list in mind when one
activates the lexical information associated with ‘lawyer’. Instead, the baggage of lex-
ical information regulates the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ by directing the interpretation
to background information that concurs with it. Take (13) for example.
(13) Simon is a lawyer.
In a context where the interlocutors have been discussing the prospect of using a legal
letter to speed up a slow refund, the meaning of ‘lawyer’ would direct its interpretation
to such background information as the interlocutor’s interest in finding someone with
the legal expertise to help them, for this piece of background information dovetails
14 The ‘or’ that disjoins (i)–(iii) is understood as inclusive disjunction.
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with some of the semanticmemory associatedwith ‘lawyer’, namely that it is normally
applied to a person learned in law. Thereby, a person learned in the law
becomes the interpretation of ‘lawyer’.
Consider another context where the interlocutors are discussing the prospect of
dating a rich bachelor and considering who might be suitable. Here the meaning
of ‘lawyer’ directs its interpretation to the background information that an attorney,
counsel or solicitor usually earns goodmoney, for such background information agrees
with (i) the semantic memory that ‘lawyer’ is normally applied to an attorney, counsel
or solicitor, and (ii) encyclopaedic information about typical salaries and lifestyles
of such a person. Thereby, ‘lawyer’ is interpreted as an attorney, counsel or
solicitor with a good salary.
In yet another context where the interlocutors are finding out the departmental affil-
iation of a student, the meaning of ‘lawyer’ directs its interpretation to the background
information that a student studying Law has some degrees of learnedness in Law, and
often intends to become a legal practitioner, for this piece of background information
fits with (a) the semantic memory that ‘lawyer’ is normally applied to a person learned
in law or a person practising law, and (b) anecdotal information about the prospect of
becoming a legal practitioner with a degree in Law. In turn, the congruent background
information renders the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ as a person studying Law.
To sum up, on the one hand, the ‘grab bag’ of lexically encoded information dictates
which background information in the context is relevant to interpreting ‘lawyer’. Only
the background information that fits with the meaning would make the cut. Hence,
‘lawyer’ cannot be interpreted as a politician, even if Simon’s being a politician
is among the background information available for interpreting (13) in a context. On
the other hand, background information can concur with various kinds of informa-
tion encoded in the meaning, such as semantic memory, encyclopaedic and anecdotal
information, to determine a suitable interpretation.
The above exemplification reflects at best a crude hypothesis on how the interpreta-
tion of a pragmatically polysemous expression is determined. Such a hypothesis stands
or fallswith psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic research into the semantic processing
of these expressions. Nonetheless, it implies an important difference in the resolution
of semantic ambiguity versus pragmatic polysemy in context. Given semantic ambi-
guity, background information selects a suitable interpretation from a list of distinct
senses, whereas with pragmatic polysemy, background information delivers a suitable
interpretation through its concurrence with a portion of the ‘grab bag’ of lexically
encoded information. Thereby, the interpretations delivered by congruent background
information may depart, to various extents, from the related senses abstracted from the
lexically encoded information for lexicographical or theoretical purposes, to witness
the interpretations of ‘lawyer’ in the above examples. Such departure indicates that the
determination of interpretation by congruent background information is not simply a
matter of sense selection.15
15 Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify the difference between semantic
ambiguity and pragmatic polysemy. Granted that one can use the term ‘ambiguity’ to cover both cases,




Might it not be a matter of sense selection plus modulation, as one reviewer sug-
gested? Arguably not, for at least two reasons. First, a one-level explanation of the
determination of context-bound interpretations, involving a direct interaction between
the inherent meaning and congruent background information, is more parsimonious
than a two-level explanation, involving sense selection over the inherent meaning and
modulation over a selected, purportedly literal interpretation (see Sect. 2). Second, just
as it is implausible to single out the literal interpretation to be modulated, it is difficult
to identify the list of related senses to be selected. For different purposes of lexico-
graphic or theoretical description, different lists of senses may be abstracted from the
lexically encoded information. Thus, a list of related senses may best be viewed as
a meta-theoretical construct that facilitates certain meta-linguistic description, rather
than a robust theoretical construct that stands to be selected.
Moreover, congruent background information seems to determine interpretation in
a relatively autonomous, non-intentional manner. For example, in a context where the
interlocutors are discussing the prospect of hiring a legal representative, ‘lawyer’ is
thereby naturally interpreted as a qualified legal practitioner. If, by uttering
(13) in such a context, the speaker intends to convey that Simon is learned in law,
although it is uncertain whether he has qualified, the utterance would be mislead-
ing, because the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ determined by the congruent background
information pre-empts the otherwise intended interpretation. Or in a context where
the interlocutors are finding out the departmental affiliation of a student, the congru-
ent background information naturally endows ‘lawyer’ with the interpretation of a
person studying Law. If, by uttering (13) in such a context, the speaker intends
to convey that Simon is a qualified barrister who is reading a degree in Philosophy,
the utterance would be confusing, again because the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ is pri-
marily fixed by the congruent background information that establishes the usage of
occupational terms to convey departmental affiliations.
Evenwhen an interpretation of ‘lawyer’ departs significantly from its central senses,
as in the use of ‘lawyer’ to catalogue kindergarten children by their aspiring careers
in the future, the interpretation seems to be mainly fixed by congruent background
information. In this case, it is determined in relation to the background information
that the children themselves use ‘lawyer’ to describe their aspiring future persona.
The latter use concurs with the meaning of ‘lawyer’, for it agrees with one’s memories
about what lawyers do, mental images about lawyers in one’s society, etc. Thus, the
background information concurs with the meaning of ‘lawyer’, albeit in a somewhat
metalinguistic way. It is such concurrence that makes the use of ‘lawyer’ palpable.
Otherwise, were the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ mainly fixed by the speaker’s intention,
it should be equally palpable to use ‘lawyer’ to catalogue children who aspire to
become anything but a lawyer.16
16 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of ‘lawyer’ for cataloguing children as a potential
counter-example to my proposal. The same reviewer also suggests the case of using ‘lawyer’ to describe
an actor who plays the role of a lawyer in a play as a potential case of modulation. However, I think the use
of the occupational term in a play or a fiction trades on its literal interpretations. In the context of the play,
‘lawyer’ retains a literal interpretation, which can be any (combination) of the common senses associated
with it. It is the truthfulness of the application of the literal interpretation to the actor that is at stake. In this
case, I do not see any modulation of the literal interpretation.
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In general, the speaker normally intends, and is expected to intend, her utterance
with ‘lawyer’ to be interpreted in such away that conforms to the interactionbetween its
encoded meaning and the congruent background information that is mutually salient.
In this sense, the encoded meaning and the congruent background information regu-
late what the speaker can sensibly and recognisably mean by ‘lawyer’. My claim here
is that such regulation features prominently in the interpretation of pragmatically pol-
ysemous expressions such as ‘lawyer’, and thereby sets them apart from expressions
whose interpretation involves relatively little lexical regulation, such as ‘something’
and ‘John’s book’. The latter expressions rely heavily on intention-based modulation
to determine their context-bound interpretations, such as something notewor-
thy/unusual/… or the book John borrows/publishes/…, with the encoded
meaning serving merely as a template for the freely enriched interpretations.17
Therefore, the effect of congruent background information on interpretation is
importantly different from that of modulation. The former governs what the speaker
intends to convey whereas the latter is governed by what the speaker intends to convey.
Granted that one could call the effect of congruent background information a kind of
‘modulation’, for the interpretation it delivers often amounts to selecting and/or adjust-
ing part of the lexically encoded information. Yet terminological dispute aside, such a
use of ‘modulation’ does nothing to tame the crucial difference between the lexically
constrained adjustment of the meaning of ‘lawyer’ and the free pragmatic adjustment
of the meaning of ‘something’.
Of course, just like standard indexicals, there are plenty of contexts in which the
interpretation of ‘lawyer’ requires specification in relation to speaker’s intention, as the
background information falls short of determining a suitably specific interpretation.
For example, in a context where no relevant background information has been estab-
lished, when Simon is introduced as a lawyer, the interpretation of ‘lawyer’ would
be specified in relation to the speaker’s intention, e.g. whether she intends to draw
attention to Simon’s learnedness in law, to his occupation, to his good salary, etc.
To consider another pair of comparative examples, supposed the invariant meaning
of ‘homemade’ implies that it is normally used to describe food that is (i) made in the
home, (ii) on the premises, or (iii) by one’s own efforts (cf. its related senses given in the
MerriamWebster Online Dictionary). If a package of food is described as ‘homemade’
in a farm shop, the meaning of ‘homemade’ would direct its interpretation to such
background information that the food is made on the premise of the farm shop from its
produces. The congruent background information suffices to fix the interpretation of
‘homemade’ used in the description, by foregrounding part of the encoded information.
By comparison, if I reply that I like homemade food when asked about my food
preferences, the background information in the context may fail to foreground any
part of the invariant meaning to deliver a suitably specific interpretation. In this case,
access to the speaker’s intention is required to specify whether I mean food made in
the home, food purchased from a farm shop that is made on its premises, food that is
handmade, or any suitable disjoint or conjoint combination thereof.
17 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the comparison between ‘lawyer’ and expressions that
carry lesser lexical constraint, e.g. ‘John’s book’.
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For an expression bereft of determinate literal interpretation, access to the speaker’s
intention is often needed to fix a suitably specific interpretation vis-à-vis a range
of potential interpretations presented by the invariant meaning and the congruent
background information. Hence, similar to the case of standard indexicals, speaker’s
intention plays a subsidiary role in pinning down a suitably specific interpretation.
Crucially, in these cases the invariantmeaning does not direct the interpretation straight
to the speaker’s intention. For otherwise, had the speaker’s intention been directly
invoked by the invariant meaning of ‘lawyer’ or ‘homemade’, one should have been
able to use ‘lawyer’ felicitously to mean a politician, or ‘homemade’ to mean
produced next to one’s home, simply by making manifest one’s intention to do
so.
The interaction among invariant meaning, congruent background information and
speaker’s intention discussed above plausibly applies to expressions whose invariant
meaning is relatively well-defined but does not correspond to a determinate literal
interpretation. For expressions devoid of a determinate literal interpretation but with
a less well-defined invariant meaning, it is possible that congruent background infor-
mation invoked by the meaning never suffices to fix a suitably specific interpretation.
Thereby, access to speaker’s intention would always be needed. In this case, it may be
tempting to claim that, as a matter of course, the invariant meaning directs interpre-
tation not only to congruent background information but also to speaker’s intention.
Here I leave open whether there are expressions whose invariant meaning directly
invokes, inter alia, speaker’s intention for their interpretations, or whether invoking
speaker’s intention in the invariant meaning is ruled out on a priori grounds because
it is “philosophically cheating” (cf. Recanati 2004: 57).18
Be that as it may, the main point of this sub-section is that just because the speaker’s
intention is involved in specifying the interpretation of an expression, and however
pervasive the involvement of speaker’s intention is in such specification, it does not
follow that the interpretation is unconstrained by the invariant meaning, or that the
interpretation is determined primarily by the speaker’s intention. For an expression
bereft of a determinate literal interpretation, the pragmatic effects on its interpretation
seem to be weak, because (i) the effects brought by the background information are
constrained by the invariant meaning so that only background information that concurs
with the meaning is relevant to determining the interpretation, (ii) the effects brought
by congruous background information are relatively autonomous from the speaker’s
communicative intention, and (iii) access to the speaker’s intention is required only
when congruent background information fails to determine a suitably specific inter-
pretation. For these reasons, the context sensitivity of such an expression seems to be
as semantically driven as that of a standard indexical.
However, this does not mean that an expression without determinate literal inter-
pretation is an indexical. In the next sub-section, I argue that indexicality is a
18 Even in the case of demonstratives, had the speaker’s intention been directly invoked by the invariant
meaning, one should have been able to use ‘that’ (qua a demonstrative) to pick out whatever one intends
to refer to, regardless of whether it is (related to anything) in one’s vicinity. However, consider a context
in which it is obvious to my interlocutor that I am looking for my key. If I ask her ‘Where is that?’ she is
likely to be puzzled by the use of ‘that’ and seek clarification by asking e.g. ‘Do you mean your key?’, even
if she knows what is on my mind.
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special case of semantically driven context sensitivity, because the context sensitivity
associated with standard indexicals, construed in terms of Kaplan’s famous charac-
ter/content dichotomy, is credited with the task of grounding the cognitive significance
of (thoughts expressed by) standard indexicals in terms of the speaker’s first-person
access to their referents (Kaplan 1989: 530). Hence, insofar as (thoughts expressed
by) expressions without determinate literal interpretation do not enjoy the cognitive
significance that standard indexicals do, they would be semantically context-sensitive
without being indexicals.
In a nutshell, the present proposal is that expressions such as ‘lawyer’ instantiate
a form of Radical Contextualism that generalises semantically driven context sensi-
tivity. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, if the invariant meaning of an expression is
less well-defined and lends itself to intention-driven specification in every appropri-
ate use, as many Travis cases seem to suggest, it may instantiate a form of Radical
Contextualism that neutralises the difference between semantically driven and prag-
matically driven context sensitivity (Recanati 2010: 19). Radical Contextualism is
understood here as a broad position that rejects a unique literal interpretation and
advocates pervasive contextual adjustment of lexical meaning. Different forms of
Radical Contextualism would adopt different views on the nature of such adjustment.
Indeed, different kinds of context-sensitive expressions may be amenable to different
forms of Radical Contextualist or Moderate Contextualist treatments. My modest aim
here is to put forward a case for a form of Radical Contextualism that recognises
pervasive, indexical-free, yet still weak pragmatic effects on interpretation, which has
been perhaps the least explored option in the literature.
4.2 Indexicality is a special case of semantic context sensitivity
Kaplan’s (1989) two-dimensional semantics for indexicals such as ‘I’ ‘here’ and ‘now’
are designed to address two semantic features that purportedly characterise the uses
of these expressions: (i) direct reference and (ii) cognitive significance in terms of
the speaker’s first-person access to the referent. For example, the occurrence of ‘I’ in
Lim’s utterance of (14) is directly referential, in that it contributes its referent at the
context of utterance, namely Lim, to the proposition expressed.
(14) Lim: I am a guitarist.
Moreover, ‘I’ in (14) yields a first-person access to its referent for the speaker, so
that Lim cannot fail to recognise that he himself is a guitarist, whereas such a fail-
ure of self-identification is possible if Lim refers to himself by another term such
as his name or a description he uniquely satisfies (Perry 1979). Consequently, Lim’s
‘I’-thoughts directly inform his actions, whereas ceteris paribus, his thoughts about
himself expressed in other co-referential terms may fail to elicit those actions. Immu-
nity to self-misidentification and the ensuing immediate connection to the self’s actions
are generally attributed to the cognitive significance of ‘I’.Mutatis mutandis, immunity
to present-time-misidentification and immunity to present-place-misidentification are




Kaplan captures the directly referential status and the cognitive significance of ‘I’
and other indexicals in terms of the content/character dichotomy. Roughly, the content
of an indexical is an element at a context of utterance, whereas the character encodes
the conceptual role played by that element at the context. Consider ‘I’ again. On the
one hand, the content of an occurrence of ‘I’ is just the individual speaker at a context,
hence satisfying direct reference. On the other, that individual plays the role of the
speaker at the context (cf. Perry 1998). In general, the role of a speaker is such that
when one is speaking, unless one is unconscious or insane, one cannot mistake anyone
else as the speaker. Hence, filling in the role of the speaker normally implies having
first-person access to oneself. By specifying that an occurrence of ‘I’ refers to the
individual that fills in the speaker role, the character of ‘I’ yields a first-person access
to its referent that guarantees immunity to self-misidentification. Mutatis mutandis for
‘now’ and ‘here’.19
Thus construed, the character of ‘I’ is not just the semantic rule which dictates that
a (non-quotational) occurrence of ‘I’ refers to the speaker or writer (Kaplan 1989:
505), and thereby directs its interpretation to the speaker or writer at a context. In so
directing, the character ensures thatwhoever is the referent of ‘I’ (normally knowingly)
plays the role of the speaker or writer at a context, and thereby has first-person access
to the referent of ‘I’. In this way, the character grounds the cognitive significance of
(a thought expressed by) ‘I’. As Kaplan remarks,
The character of ‘I’ provides the acknowledged privileged perspective, whereas
the analysis of the content of particular occurrences of ‘I’ provides for (and
needs) no privileged pictures. (1989: 534)
In the same vein, the characters of the indexicals ‘here’ and ‘now’ provide the speaker’s
first-person, ‘privileged’ perspective on their referents at a context, by specifying that
occurrences of ‘now’ and ‘here’ refer respectively to the time and place that play the
role of the present time and place.
Thus construed, the contextual variable encoded in the meaning (i.e. character) of
an indexical not only directs its interpretation to the congruent element in a context,
but also implies the conceptual role played by that element in the thought tokened
by the indexical. It is the latter implication that grounds the essential indexicality of
standard indexicals. In this respect, indexicality can be regarded as a special case of
semantically driven context sensitivity.
So far I have followedKaplan’s view on indexicals to distinguish them from expres-
sions that are arguably semantically context-sensitive but clearly non-perspectival,
such as ‘lawyer’. My main point is that if (i) indexicals give rise to cognitive sig-
nificance in terms of first-person access to their referents, and (ii) such cognitive
significance is rooted in their semantically driven context sensitivity, there should be
19 It has been argued that indexicals do not always behave in the way Kaplan envisaged, to witness ‘here’
and ‘now’ in recorded messages (e.g. Predelli 1998), first-person indexicals in languages such as Amharic
(e.g. Schlenker 2003), ‘I’ embedded in attitude reports (e.g. Stalnaker 2011; Jaszczolt 2013a), ‘I’ in quotation
(Jaszczolt and Huang 2015), etc. The non-conforming behaviours of indexicals are tangential to the present
discussion. My main point is that Kaplan’s semantic framework for indexicals (which may or may not
be absolutely correct for indexicals in natural languages) attributes to the indexicals a special kind of
semantically driven context sensitivity.
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room for a category of expressions that are semantically context-sensitive but non-
indexicals in the sense of (i) and (ii). In this paper I argue that expressions bereft of
determinate literal interpretation instantiate such a category.
However, (i) and (ii) are disputable. First, notions such as ‘first person’ ‘the self’
and ‘the present’ may be rather obscure or difficult to define in a non-circular way.
Consequently, we may not yet have a firm grasp on what a first-person access to the
referent amounts to, and how such access differs from, say, one’s cognitive access
to the referent presented by ‘Hesperus’ vis-à-vis by ‘Phosphorus’. Similarly, immu-
nity to self-misidentification and to present time/place-misidentification is in need to
clarification vis-à-vis immunity to misidentification of, say, the referent of ‘Hesperus’
as presented by ‘Hesperus’. Scepticism on the nature of the cognitive significance
attributed to indexicals has led some to question whether indexicals are cognitively
sui generis, distinct from other referential expressions (Cappelen and Dever 2013,
Magidor forthcoming). Second, even if the cognitive significance of indexicals can
be suitably characterised to justify their sui generis status, it may not be grounded in
their semantically driven context sensitivity, or in their context sensitivity in the way
Kaplan describes (cf. Perry 2001).20 Third, even if the cognitive significance is linked
to the context sensitivity, it may be neither sufficient nor necessary for indexicality.
On the one hand, it may not exhaust the semantic functions assumed by indexicals
(Kratzer 2009; Jaszczolt 2013a, b; Jaszczolt and Huang 2015); on the other, it may
permeate the use of seemingly non-indexical expressions (Jaszczolt 2013b).
While I have embraced Kaplan’s account to argue for the cognitive underpinning of
the semantically driven context sensitivity of indexicals, in virtue ofwhich they are dis-
tinguished from merely semantically context-sensitive expressions such as ‘lawyer’,
my point that indexicality is thereby a special case of semantically driven context
sensitivity is compatible with other accounts on indexicals which appeal to their con-
text sensitivity to explain their cognitive significance. However, if the sceptics are
right to think that indexicals enjoy nothing like the ‘special’ cognitive significance
commonly attributed to them, I would concede that as far as context sensitivity is
concerned, indexicals are not importantly different from other semantically context-
sensitive expressions.21 Even so, the onus of proof may still rest on the sceptics to
20 Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these two points.
21 Onemay suggest that themeaning of an indexical directs its interpretation to a concrete, objective feature
in context, whereas the meaning of an expression such as ‘lawyer’ directs its interpretation to background
information, which is abstract and subjective. However, such a suggestion does not hold up to scrutiny.
Firstly, by what criterion is the present time or place more concrete than background information? More
importantly, from the perspective of discussing how meaning interacts with context, it should not matter
whether a contextual feature is objectively or subjectively realised, any more than from the perspective
of discussing the meaning of a two-place predicate, it should matter whether the relation being denoted
is objectively or subjectively realised. For example, just because the hugging relation denoted by ‘hug’
is objectively realised in terms of physical movements whereas the loving relation denoted by ‘love’ is
subjectively realised in terms of intangible emotions, it does not follow that ‘love’ is not on a par with ‘hug’
as far as its semantic status (qua two-place predicate) is concerned. By the same token, just because present
time or place is physically trackable whereas background information is inter-subjectively traceable, it does




explain away the intuitive difference between seemingly perspectival expressions like
indexicals and non-perspectival ones such as ‘lawyer’.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, in this paper I have argued that non-ambiguous expressions whose
invariant meaning does not determine a unique literal interpretation defy a Moderate
Contextualist semantics in terms of pragmatic modulation. As their invariant meaning
directs interpretation to congruous background information in a context, they moti-
vate a form of Radical Contextualism that generalises semantically driven context
sensitivity beyond indexicality.
To start with, it is observed that for some expressions such as ‘lawyer’ and ‘book’,
the invariant meaning of the expression corresponds to a range of closely related,
equally literal and basic interpretations, none of which can be distinguished as the
literal interpretation of the expression.
Not only is the literal interpretation indeterminate, but the distinction between
a literal interpretation and a non-literal one is also vague, as shown by examples
such as ‘lawyer’ ‘musician’ and ‘open the door’. The non-uniqueness of the literal
interpretation and the vagueness in the literal/non-literal divide doubly challenge a
modulation-based contextualist semantics, for it presupposes that (i) the invariant
meaning of a non-ambiguous, non-indexical expression determines a unique literal
interpretation in every context, and (ii) the literal interpretation is distinguishable
from contextually relevant interpretations generated by modulation.
Lastly, I outlined a Radical Contextualist semantics for expressions devoid of deter-
minate literal interpretation. The gist of the present account is that the interpretation
of such an expression is primarily determined by background information at a context
that is congruent with the invariant meaning. As a result, the context sensitivity of such
an expression is primarily semantically driven, yet it does not amount to indexicality.
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